Abdulsalami: We Adopted 1979 Constitution to Ward Off Military Hawks Who Didn’t Want to Leave Power

The military could have extended the transition to democracy in 1999 by three years in order to write an entirely new constitution, Abdulsalami Abubakar, retired general and former head of state, has revealed in his autobiography.

He said some military “hawks” did not want to leave power and wanted the transition programme prolonged.

However, it was decided that the 1979 Constitution be adopted to facilitate a quick return to democratic rule after a nationwide debate co-ordinated by a 25-member Constitution Debate Co-ordinating Committee (CDCC).

Justice Niki Tibi, the CDCC chairman, said while presenting the report to Abdulsalami in 1998: “In the light of the memoranda and the oral presentation on the 1995 Draft Constitution, it is clear that Nigerians basically opt for the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments. Putting it in another language, the common denominator in the mouths of Nigerians the world over is the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments. They want it, and they have copiously given their reasons for their choice in the different memoranda and oral presentations. So, we have recommended to the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) the adoption of the 1979 Constitution with relevant amendments from the 1995 Draft Constitution.”

Abdulsalami wrote in ‘Call of Duty’ that his government had been faced with several options — including adopting the 1995 Draft Constitution which had been derided as “Abacha Constitution” in sections of the country.

He had assumed power on June 8, 1998 after the death of Sani Abacha, the head of state, and then conducted a swift transition to democracy, handing over power to president-elect Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999.

FIRST OPTION: CONTINUE WITH ABACHA TRANSITION 

“When Abacha died and I succeeded him, I had several options before me. I could choose to continue with his transition programme and that would mean organising the governorship and presidential elections and handing over power on 1 October 1998. But this had downsides. The five political parties, which the late Chief Bola Ige, former Governor of the old Oyo State, famously described as the ‘five fingers of a leprous hand’, lacked credibility. They were perceived as playthings in the hands of Abacha and they too did not cover themselves in glory when they nominated him as their presidential candidate even though he was neither their member nor legally allowed to be so adopted.

“Worse still, the mainstream South-West political establishment, which had opposed Abacha’s government, would not buy into this option. It was impossible to resolve the political crisis by keeping out June 12 activists and respected politicians who campaigned vigorously for a return to credible democracy. Many of these politicians did not belong to any of the five parties. Therefore, going ahead with Abacha’s programme would automatically exclude some of the best brains in the country.

“This option was also hindered by a basic challenge: the Draft 1995 Constitution was in limbo. The Abacha Administration had not made the draft public and most Nigerians were left guessing the form of government to be enthroned on 1 October 1998. The draft contained several provisions that were new to Nigeria. There was a provision for multiple Vice-Presidents, a Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime Minister. There were several other new provisions that amounted to sailing in uncharted waters.”

SECOND OPTION: START FROM THE SCRATCH

“There was a second option: discard the Abacha transition programme entirely and start from scratch. That would mean setting up another Constitutional Conference and rolling out another transition programme. If we chose this option, it could keep the Military in power for as many as three years. For those who wanted the Military to stay longer, this was their choice. It would allow us to buy time by creating a public debate for one year, setting up a conference that would sit for another one year to write a new constitution, and then releasing a timetable that would run for another year, taking us to at least 2001.

“This option was fraught with dangers. Clearly, I did not have any intention of prolonging my stay in office. I was not even tempted. People were already whispering to me that I did not need to rush a handover, that a lot of work needed to be done to put our democracy on sound footing. While I did not disagree with them on the need to take time to lay a solid foundation, my stand was that there was never a perfect time. Democracy is not achieved in one day. Plant the seed and it will keep growing if the players are committed to watering it.

“I reasoned that the longer the Military stayed in power after Abacha’s death, the bleaker the prospects of a genuine transition to democracy would be. There were military officers who had tasted political power and were not too willing to let go. If I prolonged the transition programme under the desire to create a perfect democracy with a perfect Constitution, I would only be giving room to the hawks in the Military to hold on to power. I could not even rule out the possibility of a coup along the line by officers who did not want the Military to quit. For me, the earlier we left, the better for the democratisation project.”

THIRD OPTION: ADOPT ‘ABACHA CONSTITUTION’

“There was the third option: do away with the Abacha transition and present the Draft 1995 Constitution to the generality of Nigerians to decide what to do with it. That meant subjecting it to further scrutiny by all the interest groups in the country. Discarding the Abacha transition plan was also a problem — it would amount to another annulment. Whether or not we liked it, the state and federal lawmakers were legally elected and people exercised their constitutional right by voting for them. It could amount to injustice to those elected and the voters.

“However, it would be easier to get away with cancelling the legislative elections because there was a national mood for reconciliation. The transition programme itself had been tainted by the conduct of the parties in adopting Abacha as their joint presidential candidate. Many who had won elections under the Abacha programme were also ready to make a sacrifice for national reconciliation. They were the new politicians in town and were probably confident of winning again.”

FOURTH OPTION: INTERIM GOVERNMENT

“There were still many other options churned out daily in the media. Some were canvassing a Government of National Unity (GNU). Under that, there would be no elections: we would simply handpick people and hand over to them. Nigerians had learnt nothing from the fate that befell the Interim National Government (ING) set up in 1993 by General Babangida after the annulment of the June 12 election. The ING did not last for 100 days before it was overthrown by the Military. I was surprised people could imagine a similar contraption as a way forward.

“Some demanded that we should hold a sovereign national conference. The same people were canvassing all sorts of systems that were disguised attempts at breaking up the country. Some were speaking about regional armies and confederalism. I fought a war to keep Nigeria one. I still carry the scars and pellets in my body. As a military officer, as the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I swore to an oath to keep the country one. I would never be part of any arrangement to break up Nigeria. That duty I owed to myself and the Nigerian federation.”

FIFTH OPTION: ADOPT 1979 CONSTITUTION WITH ALTERATIONS

“After much pondering, we decided to give the Draft Constitution a chance by setting up a 25-member Constitution Debate Co-ordinating Committee (CDCC), chaired by Justice Niki Tobi with Dr Suleiman Kumo serving as Deputy Chairman. Its job was to pilot the debate, coordinate and collate views and recommendations canvassed by individuals and groups on a new constitution, using the 1995 Draft as a compass.

“I must confess that [their recommendation to adopt the 1979 Constitution] was a welcome relief to me. Adopting the Draft Constitution wholesale would definitely be opposed by the Afenifere/NADECO bloc, which never wanted to have anything to do with Abacha. There was the real danger that we could go into another phase of crisis over that. For someone who wanted to get the transition programme done with as quickly as possible, I was quite comfortable with the option of adopting the 1979 Constitution.”