Coups d’État As Means of Permissible Change of Government: The Myth and Reality Of The ASS, By Bola A. Akinterinwa 

The ASS is Alliance of Sahel States, the English acronym for Alliance des États du Sahel. It was done on 16 September 2023 in protest against the threats by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to use force to restore civil order in the République du Niger, the immediate northern neighbour of Nigeria. The ECOWAS of 15 Member States, which comprised Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has a zero-tolerance for unconstitutional change of government in its region. Mali and Burkina Faso first played host to unconstitutional changes of Government. The ECOWAS made efforts to bring the military junta that came to power to their knees, but to no avail. 

Consequently, when another coup took place in Niger, the ECOWAS sent a message of ‘enough is enough’ to the military junta by threatening to use force to restore President Mohammed Bazoum to power. President Bazoum was ousted by General Abdoulrahmane Tchiani, the head of the Presidential Guard. The ASS considered that the ECOWAS had not been helpful in containing terrorism, and particularly in resisting French mainmise. Nigériens condemned the French support for the elected President, Mohammed Bazoum, who reportedly was oppressing the Nigériens. Consequently, the Nigériens opted to give active support to the military junta a situation that has changed the nature of the coup from being military in origin to people’s coup in outcome. 

By implication, the ECOWAS agenda of using force against the military junta now necessarily implies the use of force against the people, the civilians, and all the internationally-protected people. More importantly, this development prompted the solidarity of the peoples in Burkina Faso and Mali to also consider that any attack on the Republic of Niger is also an attack on their own people. It was in anticipation of an eventual aggression by the ECOWAS that led to the decision to withdraw their membership of the ECOWAS and to establish the ASS. In carrying out the analysis, what do we mean by a people’s coup as distinct from a coup d’état. The issue is no more about coup-making but about membership withdrawal from the ECOWAS. Coup is illegal but withdrawal of membership is not. Quo vadis? 

Permissibility of People’s and Military Coups d’État 

The discussion of the permissibility of a people’s coup and a military coup d’état raises many questions in the political governance of Africa: legality or illegality, extent of relevance of liberal democracy, conduct and management of democracy, future of inter-state solidarity in Africa, and permissibility of coups. These issues are problematic and are not easy to resolve. For example, a coup can be illegal but still tolerated. In the Republic of Chad, a presidential system of government is what the Constitution provides for. The President serves as Head of State and as Head of Government, but cannot serve for more than two five-year terms. More importantly, the Chadian Constitution stipulates that, in the event of the demise of the president or in the case of a presidential vacuum, the President of the National Assembly should not only act as interim President, but must also organise a fresh presidential election within sixty days.

True enough, Idriss Déby died in the battle field while defending his country against armed groups. His death necessarily created a vacuum to be filled. Probably in consideration of how President Déby died, the military not only seized power and dissolved the National Assembly, but also appointed the son of Idriss Déby as successor in flagrant contradiction of the provisions of the Chadian Constitution. The politics of deviating from the constitutional provisions is quite interesting. The Western powers, particularly France and the United States, submitted that President Idriss Déby was the most reliable in the protection of their interests, not only in Chad but also in the region. They did not see anyone else that could fit in well as a successor. In the same vein, and for other reasons, all those countries preaching the sermon of non-acceptability of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa kept quiet. 

France that had laid the foundation for democratisation fever in Africa by making democratisation a conditionality for development aid to Africa at the 2000 Franco-African Summit held in La Baule, kept mute. In fact, the African Union disgraced African people by eating its own words and condoning unconstitutional change of government. By so doing, the coup in Chad was a typical case of permissible coup.

A second problematic is that Africa wants democratic rule but elected leaders that are required to promote it are not only dictatorial in attitude and behaviour, but are also wrapped up in the glory of their very corrupt regalia with which they frolic around. Many African leaders use democratic freedom to elongate their stay in power, hence prompting protests and democratic coups. They openly and consciously abuse human rights and sustain their stay in power with foreign support. 

. Consequently, what do we mean really mean by a people’s coup as distinct from a coup d’état. To what extent is their permissibility in the political governance of Africa, and particularly in the West African and ECOWAS region? These questions are raised because they often prompt public protests and also prompt the military to take advantage of the situation, and launch a coup with the active support of the people against an elected government. When the people desire a change and the democratic administration in power gives little or no regard to public complaints, the military cannot but be compelled to give effect to public demands.

Without any shadow of doubt, the discipline often required of the military in the developed countries is that under no circumstance should there be any forceful change of government. Institutions are strong in the more developed countries. In Africa, there are no strong institutions. In fact, many countries are governed more by foreign powers than by the locally elected governments.  

As such, when discussing unconstitutional changes of government, which type of coup is unwanted in Africa? Put differently, in whose interest is the threat of use of force by the ECOWAS against Niger: military junta or the people? Does the ECOWAS want to protect a purported democratic regime to the detriment of the interest of the people of Niger who are against democratic dictatorship? To what extent can the ECOWAS prevent the ASS countries from protesting against neo-colonial exploitation of the people of Niger and their resources? Perhaps most interestingly, the ECOWAS is making spirited efforts to reconcile its differences with the ASS. The ECOWAS under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) strongly believed that the ASS countries will, sooner than later, return to the ECOWAS. We consider this more of a myth than reality. It is against this background that the exegesis of myth and reality of the ASS is carried out in this current Vie Internationale

First of all, every coup is generally a resultant from either constitutional manipulation by incumbent president, or from electoral disputations, and from lack of democratic culture and security concerns. Many observers often limitedly equate democracy with elections and coups d’état as a forceful removal of an elected leader. The African Union has already identified four categories of unconstitutional change of government in Africa: military coup d’état, intervention by the mercenaries, replacement by armed dissident groups and non-preparedness to hand over power in the face of transparent electoral defeat.

It is important to note that in the case of the first three types, there is the factor of use of force, but the fourth type, refusal to accept defeat, is more about manipulation which can eventually involve the use of force at a later stage. The example of President Laurent Gbagbo of the Côte d’Ivoire clearly illustrates our observation here. He refused to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara who was generally believed to have truly won the country’s presidential election. The ECOWAS, with international support, threatened to use force and Laurent Gbagbo had to accept. President Gbagbo first began with allegations of ethnic origin of Alassane Ouattara, arguing the case of Ivoirité, that his father was a Burkinabé and not Ivoirien. He later attempted the argument of electoral malpractices. All his arguments did not work but clearly point to the international politics of presidential succession in Africa. This brings us to the cases of presidential succession in West Africa, and particularly the ASS countries. Is the problem still that of unconstitutional change of government in the ASS countries or that of good governance? Who is interested in the issue of unconstitutional change of government as of today? Is the ASS still a myth or reality?

Myth and Reality of the ASS 

First, it is quite mythical to believe that the ASS has any good intention to return to the ECOWAS. It is a myth because the ASS has pledged not to return because of its belief that the ECOWAS has become more of a threat than a development ally. When the ECOWAS extended the expiry date of membership withdrawal of the ASS members from January 2024 to July 2024, with the objective of keeping the ECOWAS doors open for possible reconciliation, the ASS rejected it with a very thought-provoking allegation. 

As noted by the www.africanews.com, on 23 December 2024, the extension was ‘nothing more than yet another attempt by the French and its auxiliaries to continue planning and carrying out destabilising actions against the AES.’ Therefore the ASS made it clear that the extension of date was of no binding effect and that their withdrawal from ECOWAS was ‘irreversible.’ In fact, the ASS accused the ECOWAS of its ‘inhumane and irresponsible’ coup-related sanctions. These accusations reflect the deep extent of the bitterness of the ASS. 

Secondly, and perhaps more disturbingly, the ASS is not simply conceived as a protest but as a replacement of the ECOWAS. It is designed to be an instrument of resistance to the exploitation by foreign powers. So, ECOWAS, by aligning with foreign powers, has become another foreign power that should similarly also be resisted. General Abdourahamane Tiani has made it clear that the formation of the ASS is ‘the culmination of our (AES) determined common will to reclaim our (AES) national sovereignty… Our people have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS… It is up to us today to make the AES Confederation an alternative to any artificial regional group by building a … community free from the control of foreign powers.’ Thus, asking for the return of the ASS is also telling them not to reclaim their national sovereignty. In the eyes of the ASS, the ECOWAS is nothing more than an artificial regional group.

Thirdly, the ECOWAS-ASS dispute has gone beyond the regional level to becoming more internationalised. The ASS has kicked out France and welcomed Russia as a replacement. In this regard, the ASS also sees the ECOWAS as a puppet organisation of France, implying a direct confrontation between the ASS conflict with France and the friendship between France and the ECOWAS. There is no shared value in this context. The perceived common enemy of the ASS, which is France, cannot be expected to be an ally of the ECOWAS and still expect the ASS to accept to hub nub with the ECOWAS. 

Fourthly, the ASS has adopted a common stand against Algeria who gunned down a Malian drone in the war against terrorists and Tuareg rebellion. Algeria, which once served as a mediator in the more than a decade conflict between the Government of Mali and the Tuaregs downed a Malian drone in the belief that it had violated Algerian airspace by more than two kilometres (1.2 miles). Mali considers the act as ‘irresponsible’ (vide AP, 07 April 2025 and arabnews.com). Algeria, disagreeing with the ASS decision to turn to Russia, also feared the possible extension of the Russian-supported Malian intensified assault on the rebellion to its territory. Consequently, the ASS cannot be making progress, taking one step forward and be expected to take two steps backward by returning to the ECOWAS. And true enough, in reaction, the Alliance not only condemned the Algerian act but also said the act is ‘contrary to historical relations and fraternal relations between the peoples of the AES Confederation and the Algerian people.’ The ASS withdrew their respective ambassadors from Algeria in protest. Put differently, the ASS has been acting jointly. Expecting Niger, for instance, to betray their Liptako-Gourma accord is more of a myth.

Fifhly, Senegal and Ghana, as well as Nigeria have taken different initiatives to convince the ASS to return to the ECOWAS but all the efforts have so far been to no avail. The Ghanaian president, John Mahama, noted at the inauguration of the 50th Anniversary of the ECOWAS in Accra that ‘the recent decision by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to withdraw from the ECOWAS is a regrettable development’ and that his government had appointed a special envoy to ‘initiate high-level conversations’ with the ASS. As President Mahama further put it, ‘we must respond not with isolation or recrimination, but with understanding, dialogue and a willingness to listen and to engage…’ In spite of Ghana’s prioritisation of diplomatic reengagement with the ASS, the return of the ASS has not been forthcoming, thus reconfirming the outcome of the earlier mediation efforts of the Senegalese leader, Bassirou Diomaye Faye. The outcome was that he had ‘done everything possible’ to make the ASS return to the ECOWAS but all the efforts have been in vain.

Sixthly, the withdrawal of the ASS is not illegal. It has the great potential to fast track regional integration, Article 1 (d) and (e) of the Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, which was done on June 3, 1991 and entered into force on May 12, 1994, provided for the possibility of carving out a sub-regional body from an existing regional body. The establishment of the ASS is therefore consistent with this 1991 Treaty. For the purposes of integration and development, the Treaty sub-divided the stages of development into six: establishment and strengthening of existing regional economic communities; elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers;, inter-RECs Free Trade area and customs Union; African Common Market; and Pan-African Monetary and Economic Union. The ASS has been established and is gradually being strengthened in consonance with the first stage. The forward movement of the ASS has therefore become difficult to wind down or backward. What is doable now and that should be encouraged is collaboration on the basis of possible ASS associate membership of the ECOWAS. 

From the foregoing, as we have noted several times in this column, it cannot but be a myth to be dreaming of a return of the ASS as individual Member States. Even as a sub-regional organisation, the favourable environmental conditionings are yet to exist for their foreseeable return. The situational reality of the ASS as of today lends much credence to our previous observations. It should be recalled that the three military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso came into being as a result of shared domestic challenges, especially political instability-driven insecurity, with the particular problems of Tuareg and terrorist rebellion.

In Mali, for instance, there is the problem of rapid population growth and low agricultural productivity. There is also the challenge of how to manage the impact of climate change. Mali has no diversified economy. This was partly the background to the emergence of political instability in 2012 when a coup d’état occurred and the northern part of Mali had to be occupied by armed groups. The French came in 2013 to assist Mali but their efforts could not change the situation. The situation eventually led to another institutional breakdown on 18 August, 2020 when a National Transitional Council was set up and ultimately to the declaration of Colonel Assimi Goïta as Head of State.

What has happened since then is that a National Dialogue for Peace and Reconciliation was held from April 13 to May 10, 2024. Maintenance of peace and security was predicated on the approach of ‘solutions by consensus’ and two solutions were agreed to consensually: extension of military rule from three to five years before democratic elections and the amendment of Article 9 of the Transitional Charter to allow President Assimi Goïta to participate in the next presidential election. Thus, the consensual solution has legitimised coup-making. It has legalised an initial act of illegality. In fact, the Council of Ministers promoted Assimi Goïta to the rank of an Army General along with four others, on October 16, 2024. This background largely explains why Mali joined Burkina Faso and Niger in signing the Liptako-Gourma Charter on September 16, 2023 to create the ASS.

Since joining, Mali has been witnessing economic recovery. The economy is driven by agriculture and services. A mining Code was introduced in 2023. The Code has enabled the State to control the mining sector. The GDP growth rate was about 4.0% in 2024.  Inflation rate that was put at 10% in 2022 has been declining since then. Informal sector now accounts for about 33% of the GDP. In 2023, a constitutional referendum with a 38% turn out and with a reported 97% approval rate was held in 2023. This is governance by consensus.

In the same vein, Niger has been threading the paths of de-Frenchification and self-help development. Niger has dumped French as its lingua franca. It was replaced with Hausa on March 31, 2025 in a Charter and published in the government’s Official Journal. French and English languages have been given the status of working languages. If the French troops were sent packing in December 2023 by Niger, the ECOWAS cannot and should not seek any fraternisation with France that is detrimental to the interests of the ASS.

The ASS is not only now a major defining factor in the relationship between the ECOWAS and France, but also a major definiendum of the status of liberal democracy in the political governance of Africa. It has not only completely made a nonsense of the non-acceptability of unconstitutional change of government (UCG), but has also become the first application of Article 1 (d) and (e) of the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. UCG is no longer limited to change of government by use of force. Apart from military coups against an elected government, intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratic government, and replacement of a democratic government by armed and dissident groups, as well as rebel movements, there is also the refusal of incumbent presidents to accept their defeat after presidential election loss. In the eyes of the African Union, all these cases constitute UCG, and therefore impermissible. In spite of the provisions of the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance which both prohibit UCG, there is yet to be any lasting solution to the recidivist problem of UCG. In fact, the UCG are being condoned and consciously legitimised. Consequently, there are permissible coups d’état. Coups against autocratic governments as it was the case in Sudan, the coup in Chad and the threats of coup against Laurent Gbagbo in the Côte d’Ivoire are good pointers.