National Insecurity and Recidivist Coup in Guinea Bissau: Strategic Autonomy Ambassadors as an Antidote, By Bola A. Akinterinwa 

In his address to Nigeria’s plenipotentiaries in Abuja on 29 July 2023, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) noted that ‘our diplomacy must translate into tangible benefits for the Nigerian people – jobs, security, and dignity.’ This statement is consistent with Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji’s postulation of constructive and beneficial concentricism in Nigeria’s foreign policy. In addition to Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari’s foreign policy concentric circles that defined Nigeria’s foreign policy implementation on the basis of four concentric circles – innermost circle, West Africa circle, Africa circle, and the whole world – Ambassador  Adeniji, CON, argued that, in each circle of implementation, foreign policy must be constructive in approach and beneficial to all Nigerians in outcome. Consequently, translating Nigeria’s diplomacy into tangible benefits for the Nigerian people cannot but be a most welcome development.

It is against this background that ‘strategic autonomy’ has not only been made the fulcrum of the administration of PBAT, but also why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also been working tooth and nail to make the pursuit of strategic autonomy a foreign policy objective. True, strategic autonomy is about self-reliance, self-capacity building to ensure security, to innovate and create new jobs, as well as promote national dignity, diplomatic strength, and respect for the people of Nigeria.

However, since 2023, the objective of job creation has not been easy to achieve. The polity has been fraught with increasing insecurity. National self-respect and dignity has been far-fetched. While efforts are strenuously been made to contain boko haramism on the one hand, coup-making is also threatening national security, not only in Nigeria, but also in the sub-region, on the other. And true enough, Nigeria, under PBAT, chaired the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State in 2023 when the elected President Mohammed Bazoum of Niger Republic was ousted by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, his Commander of Presidential Guard. The crisis led to the issuance of a military threat to Niger and the eventual withdrawal of membership of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali from the ECOWAS because of its zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government. Now, Guinea Bissau plays host to another coup. What is the future of unconstitutional change of government in Africa?  

Recidivist Coup in Guinea Bissau 

The coup that ousted the administration of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló in Guinea Bissau last week Wednesday, 26 November, 2025 was led by Brigadier-General Denis N’Canha, the Head of the Presidential Guard. The coup came on the heels of the presidential and legislations elections held on Sunday, 23rd November, 2025 and the results of which were scheduled to be released on Thursday, 27 November, 2025. Thus the organisation of the coup was meant to prevent the release of the election results.

The coupists established the High Military Command for the Restoration of Order which is headed by Army General Horta N’Tam. The establishment of the High Military Command apparently ignored the fact that the ECOWAS Commission had deployed a Medium-Term Election Observation Mission (MTEOM) from 14 to 28 November 2028 to Guinea Bissau. The Election Observation Mission (EOM) comprised seasoned professionals: election experts, political analysts, legal experts, media specialists, conflict prevention experts, gender experts and security analysts. The high-level EOM has the objective of not only monitoring the conduct of the election processes, especially in the context of its consistency with the electoral regulations, but also to be able to attest to the legitimacy and credibility of the election. Most unfortunately, however, the determination of the legitimacy and credibility was cut short by the coup d’état. 

Why the coup? How do we explain the fact that the ousted President Embaló was not only a victim of coup attempts in 2022 and 2023 but also in October 2025?  Why has Guinea Bissau been politically unstable since the time of its independence in 1974?  With the last week coup, Guinea Bissau has had nine coups d’états, failed and successful. The first coup took place in November 1980 when Prime Minister Joao Bernando Vieira ousted President Luis Cabral in a bloodless coup. This was followed in 1985 with an alleged coup against President Vieira and several senior military officers who were arrested and six of whom were executed or died in detention.

There was a reported coup attempt in 1998 that prompted a civil war, especially following the dismissal of Brigadier-General Ansumane Mane by President Vieira. Expectedly, Brigadier General Ansumane Mane led a counter-military revolt against President Vieira in May 1999 which compelled President Vieira to resign from power after one year-long civil war. Without doubt, Guinea Bissau is a terra cognita for political power struggle. President Kumba Yala was elected President in 2003 but had violent relationship with General Mane who lost his life in one of the clashes. In that same year, President Yala was ousted in a bloodless coup led by General Verissimo Correia Seabra in September 2003. General Seabra was also killed during an army revolt.

Even though Henrique Rosa temporarily took over power after the demise of General Seabra, President Vieira, after surviving many coup attempts, was killed on March 2, 2009 ‘by a group of soldiers allegedly loyal to his main rival, army Chief of Staff, General Batista Tagme Na Waie, who had been killed in a bomb blast the previous day (Reuters, “What to know about Guinea-Bissau’s history of coups and instability,” November 27, 2025). The implicative interpretation of this quotation is that President Vieira might have engineered the bombing of his opponent and the supporters of his opponents revenged by killing Vieira the following day. In this regard, why are African leaders using ‘killing’ of opponents as an instrument of self-survival? What type of democracy is this?

After President Vieira came Raimundo Pereira who occupied the presidential seat until the election of Malam Bacai Sanha in September. Bacai Sanha was president from 8 September 2009 until his death on 9 January 2012. In April 2012 the military took over power and detained Raimundo Pereira, the election front-runner Carlos Gomes Junior, and his challenger, Kumba Yala. February 2022 was the time for another coup against President Umaro Sissoco Embaló who survived it. He experienced another coup attempt in December 2023 around the National Assembly. This is why Guinea Bissau is specially recognised for coup making and for being a transit hub for drug. Drug cartels, at times from Latin America, have been identified as sponsors of coups in Guinea Bissau.

As a result of the coup attempt of 2023, President Embaló had to dissolve the Parliament. It should be recalled here that, on 30 November to 1 December 2023, there were clashes between government forces and some units of the National Guard who reportedly released two ministers accused of corruption from detention. The National Guard Commander, Colonel Victor Tchongo, was arrested. In the eyes of Embaló, it was a coup attempt. Consequently, he not only dissolved the National Assembly, but also opted to govern by decree. This prompted the opposition elements to accuse him of fabricating crises as a justification to crack down on the opposition. In a democratic setting, how do we justify political governance by decree? Was the 26 November coup meant to disrupt democratic governance? Was it truly orchestrated by President Embaló, knowing fully well that he actually lost the election to his main rival but was not prepared to concede defeat? This was one of the arguments of the opposition who claimed victory even before the contemplation of the release of the election results. President Embaló is also claiming victory? Most curiously, he was the one who first told the world of a military coup against his administration before the military came in.

In this regard, the coup d’état can also be explained and understood against the background of President Embaló’s efforts at building a sort of self-survivalist political system that would sustain his continued stay in power. In his first two years in power, he dissolved the National Assembly twice, allegedly in reaction to coup attempts. His tenure reportedly came to an end on 27 February 2025 but he reportedly manipulated the Supreme Court to shift the date to 4 September 2025. This prompted the opposition elements to capitalise on the alleged manipulation and to sustain campaigns against it which is considered as illegality. 

And true enough again, President Embaló replaced his Prime Minister, Rui Duarté de Barros, with Braima Camara, a former opposition figure, in August 2025. Additionally, the major and lead political party in the country, the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guine and Cape Verde), was excluded from participating in the 2025 presidential and legislative election as a result of a Court ruling. The main candidate of the PAIGC, Domingos Simões Pereira (alias DSP) was disqualified allegedly for submitting his candidacy late. In the eyes of the opposition elements, all these developments were consciously enabled to ensure the continuity of stay in power of President Embaloó. Some unconfirmed sources have alleged that in the first round of election that President Embaló actually did not win the election. Whatever is the case, what future has Guinea Bissau of coup d’états? What future has the African Union and the ECOWAS’ policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government in Africa? To what extent can the ECOWAS be able to sanction the coupists in Bissau? Can Guinea Bissau be forced into withdrawing from the ECOWAS if need be? Africa, quo vadis? 

Strategic Autonomy Ambassadors as Antidote 

One possible antidote to coup making is the rigorous pursuit of the policy of strategic autonomy by Nigeria. Africa truly needs a giant worth the name. Africa needs a self-reliant leader that can be respected and relied upon. Africa needs a country like Nigeria that can be strategically autonomous. This is because strategic autonomy is about acquiring the ability or capacity to make sovereign decisions to do and undo. It is about mobilising internal resources to act without undue external dependence on any foreign power.

Strategic autonomy is a security mechanism to reduce vulnerability to unwanted external shocks. There is no disputing the fact that reliance on external powers for critical infrastructure, technology, food, energy, etc. cannot but be an exposition to coercion, geo-political manipulation, and supply disruptions. Strategic autonomy helps to reduce the challenges of insecurity, especially through the diversification of strategic partnership, building domestic industrial and technological capacity, as well as strengthening national resilience against threats of insecurity.

The pursuit of strategic autonomy also has the potential to enhance indigenous defence production, modernisation of military doctrine, professionalization of security institutions and intelligence self-reliance. Internal sources of insecurity cannot but be also addressed through institutional capacity-building, economic sovereignty, and local content development. More importantly, Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar noted at the closing ceremony of the 26th Regular Course of the Foreign Service Academy in late October 2025 in Abuja that ‘the neglect of the Foreign Service Academy is emblematic of the diminishing role of diplomacy and diplomats in governance. 

And the consequence of this is a deficiency of statecraft.’ Consequently, the Foreign Minister added, this is why his objective is ‘skilling our diplomats to perform and compete in the 21st Century.’

Without any whiff of doubt, skilling our diplomats has become a desideratum in light of Nigeria’s quest for the status of a strategic autonomous country. Diplomats should be trained and oriented towards becoming ambassadors of strategic autonomy. As strategic autonomy ambassadors, it cannot but be expected that they will have in their Mission Charter the pursuit of how to promote Nigeria’s self-reliance in various ramifications in their host countries. Learning more about strategic autonomy as a new foreign policy objective is what emphasis should be placed on. As Ambassador Tuggar himself put it, ‘if the new diplomats embrace lifelong learning, their ‘diplomatic life will know no limits’ especially if they also ‘look beyond postings and protocol assignments and aim to be innovative, resilient and purpose-driven.’ The operational word here is being ‘purpose-driven.’

As PBAT has appointed the first three ambassadors-designate for France, Great Britain, and the United States, the appointment must be purpose-driven. In the thinking of the Foreign Minister, ‘our mission must serve as economic outposts, actively promoting investment, trade, technological cooperation in every host country.’ This objective is good but not good enough for the purposes of strategic autonomy which essentially requires capacity building. One cannot build on capacity that does not exist or that has not been acquired. Every diplomatic mission of Nigeria must underscore the need to acquire capacity in the aforementioned areas of economic cooperation, trade, technological cooperation. It is this capacity acquisition that will ultimately de required to decide whether to act or not to act, to do or undo, whether to be autonomous of a foreign power’s policy stand or not.

So far, so good. PBAT, in accordance with Section 171 (1), (2)( C ) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, by which PBAT has the power to appoint ambassadors, has forwarded the names of three ambassadors-designate for the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The ambassadors-designate are retired Colonel Lateef Kayode Are from Ogun State, Aminu Mohammed Dalhatu from Jigawa State, and Ayodele Oke from Oyo State. They are men of dignity and professional experience, but who should still be required to arm themselves with new skills aimed at navigating the challenges of strategic autonomy, which is more about self-reliance and capacity building than seeking to be an isolationist.  

The nominations of Ambassaor Ayodele Oke and Colonel Kayode Are are particularly of interest for various reasons. Ambassador Oke studied economics and political science at the Emory University, Atlanta, in the United States. He was formerly an international functionary at the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. And true enough, he was not only a diplomatic careerist, but also a former Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency. His exposure to American educational environment, his exposure as a diplomat and as international functionary, coupled with his intelligence background undoubtedly qualify him to be a notable diplomatist in the protection of Nigeria’s national interest in the context of the quest for strategic autonomy.

In the same vein, Colonel Kayode Are is a man of intelligence in various ramifications. He was formerly the Director-General of the Nigerian State Security Service from 1999 to 2007. He briefly served as National Security Adviser in 2010. Like Ambassador Oke served in the National Intelligence Agency, so did Colonel Are serve at the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Educationally, he is very sound, having earned a First Class Honours degree in Psychology in 1980 from the University of Ibadan. He not only won the University Senate Prize, and the Faculty of Social Science Prize, but also the Department of Psychology Prize for best graduating student. Additionally, he obtained a Master’s degree in International Law and Diplomacy from the University of Lagos in 1987. His good performance at the Nigerian Defence Academy as part of the NDA Regular Course 12 in 1974 largely informed his deployment to the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corp. He was among the best ten student officers by then.

Ambassador Amin Dalhatu is a diplomatic careerist who served as Nigeria’s Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador to South Korea from 2017 to 2023. Even though Ambassador Oke and Colonel Are appear to have better educational background, there is no disputing the fact that Amin Dalhatu had gone through advanced diplomatic internal training in the Foreign Ministry, a training that has qualified him for consideration for accreditation to a Grade A diplomatic mission to which the United States, United Kingdom and France do belong. In other words, the quest for strategic autonomy is a very serious business and must be so considered. It requires the best of brains and seasoned minds. Strategic autonomy is not about isolationism per se. It is more than that.

In this regard, it is important to respond to some questions raised by some academic observers of Nigeria’s foreign policy. For instance, Jideofor Adibe, in his “Interrogating Minister Tuggar’s ‘Strategic Autonomy’ thesis,” published in the Premium Times on February 18, 2025, noted that ‘it will certainly be wrong for the minister to mistake multiple dependencies or even a non-alignment policy, for strategic autonomy.’ In fact, he asked further: “is Nigeria really able to achieve strategic autonomy (meaning acting independently) even as a regional power, where almost all the countries in the region are also dependent on one big power or the other.’ This observation is pertinent but does not recognise the declared, the intended, or given meaning of strategic autonomy by Foreign Minister Tuggar. 

As explained by Tuggar during an interactive session in Washington D.C., Nigeria is ‘very wary of Africa becoming the ground for the great power contestation that has been changed from a unipolar to a multipolar world. This tends to attract contestation by great powers. Our outlook is that of strategic autonomy.’ More important, he added that ‘we get along with everyone. We also have a history of non-alignment, but we are democratic. We have had several successive elections since 1999. We don’t want to see any private military company or mercenaries on our continent (see Fred Brains’ “Nigeria’s Strategic Autonomy on Global Politics Non-Negotiable,” ChannelsAfrique.com). 

Thus, in the calculations of Ambassador Yusuf Tuggar, strategic autonomy is conceptualised to be an endogenous, rather than an exogenous solution to likely future global challenges that Nigeria might be failed with in an emerging multipolar setting. It is a foreign policy quest, a foreign policy objective, not simply to seek autonomy or an independentist status. It is to first acquire capacity, self-reliance in the various levels of national creativity and productivity. It is to lay the foundations for self-reliance beginning from the nuclear family level, to the extended family level, then to the community or local government level, and then to the state and national levels. When individuals are self-reliant in education, in technological know-how, in industry and production, in agriculture and indigenous culture, in security and defence, if there is any threat of whatever kind, the Government of the nation cannot but find it easier to mobilise nationally to ensure peace and security at home, to defend the country against external threats, and to foster national unity. The implicative requirement is to take all necessary steps to create national awareness about the need for strategic autonomy at all facets of national life. Many scholars have wrongly interpreted Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s meaning of non-alignment which was never meant to say that Nigeria could not align. Nigeria could align or not align but the decision to do so or not to do is left to Nigeria’s national interest to determine at the time of decision-taking. Consequently, what PBAT should underscore in the appointment of ambassadors-designate is usefulness and capacity to promote strategic autonomy in their host countries. Nigeria needs Strategic Autonomy Ambassadors at this critical stage of her life.